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Abstract
Multi-agent reinforcement learning is an extension of reinforcement learning
concept to multi-agent environments. Reinforcement learning allows to pro-
gram agents by reward and punishment without specifying how to achieve
the task. Formally agent-environment interaction in multi-agent reinforcement
learning is presented as a discounted stochastic game. The task the agents are
facing is formalized as the problem of finding Nash equilibria.
This thesis is devoted to development of multi-agent reinforcement learning
algorithms. We propose an algorithm converging in self-play to Nash equi-
libria for high percentage of general-sum discounted stochastic games. The
approach is based on generalization of replicator dynamics for discounted
stochastic games. Before there was no algorithm that converged to Nash
equilibria for general-sum discounted stochastic games (only for particular
cases). The approach also outperforms the methods for solving general-sum
discounted stochastic games: nonlinear optimization and stochastic tracing
procedure. These algorithms function under the assumption that the games
are known from the very beginning in contrast to reinforcement learning where
the agent’s task is to learn an optimal behavior in unknown environment. An-
other contribution is an algorithm that always converges to stationary policies
and to best-response strategies against stationary opponents. Unlike the first
algorithm it doesn’t require that the opponents’ rewards are observable. We
give theoretical foundations for the convergence of the algorithms proposed
in this thesis.
The possible application areas include traditional reinforcement learning
tasks in multi-agent environments like robot soccer and development of trad-
ing agents along with numerous economic problems as a rule modeled as
differential games in the field of capital accumulation, advertising, pricing,
macroeconomics, warfare and resource economics. We propose to approxi-
mate the differential games with stochastic games and apply the developed
solver.
